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Abstract The paper focuses upon a neglected area of EU merger control, the
acquisition of minority shareholdings that have the potential to cause competitive
harm at the European Union level, and which therefore should be vetted under EU
law. Using economic theory and actual cases vetted by European Regulators, the
paper demonstrates an EU regulatory enforcement gap in respect of the aforesaid
minority shareholdings. The Commission’s recent proposal to end this gap, the so-
called targeted transparency system, is then critically explored, revealing that the
proposed system suffers from the same problem as the EU merger control regime in
respect of mergers with a potential community competition concern: neither can
guarantee that nearly all the said mergers and minority shareholdings cases would
be vetted under EU law. Therefore, an alternative more cooperative approach,
which guarantees that virtually all such cases would come under EU law, is put
forward. The more cooperative approach concerning mergers is discussed first, as
the approach toward minority shareholdings is an extension of it, establishing an
integrated approach. The paper demonstrates how this approach would guarantee
that virtually all mergers with a potential community competition concern would
come under EU law, leading to a number of positives: the near elimination of the
misallocation problem and associated issues, in addition to streamlining the oper-
ation of the said architecture. Thereafter, the paper reveals how the more cooper-
ative approach ensures that virtually all minority shareholdings with a potential to
cause competitive harm at the EU level would be vetted under EU law, not only
ending this enforcement gap but also leading to an architecture that is more
streamlined than would be the case if the Commission’s proposal became law. It is,
of course, recognised that the more cooperative approach does not address the
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minority shareholdings’ enforcement gap that exists at the national level, excluding
the three member states which already have this vetting capability.
Keywords European Union Law  Minority shareholdings  EU merger
control  Architecture of separate jurisdictional zones  Targeted transparency
system  More cooperative approach
Introduction
The publication of the Commission’s proposal concerning minority shareholdings1
forming an integral part of an amended European Union Merger Regulation2
(EUMR) makes it timely to explore this neglected area of EU merger control.
Initially, using economic theory and actual cases vetted by European regulators, the
paper reveals an enforcement gap in respect of minority shareholdings which cause
competitive harm at the EU level. Thereafter, the Commission’s proposal to end this
gap, known as the targeted transparency system,3 which intentionally fits with the
EUMR’s established architecture of separate jurisdictional zones, is explored.
However, the paper reveals that the inability of the architecture of separate
jurisdictional zones to guarantee that nearly all merger cases with a potential
Community competition concern would be vetted under EU law is echoed by the
Commission’s targeted transparency system in respect of minority shareholdings.
Therefore an alternative more cooperative approach which guarantees the afore-
mentioned in respect of both mergers and minority shareholdings is advanced.
The more cooperative approach in relation to mergers4 is explained first, as the
approach toward minority shareholdings is an extension of it, creating an integrated
approach within the architecture of separate jurisdictional zones. The paper
demonstrates how this approach will guarantee that virtually all mergers with a
potential Community competition concern would come under EU law, and that this
leads to a number of positives: the near elimination of the misallocation problem and
associated issues, in addition to streamlining the operation of the said architecture.
Thereafter, the paper reveals how the more cooperative approach ensures that virtually
all minority shareholdings with a potential to cause competitive harm at the EU level
would be vetted under EU law, not only ending this enforcement gap but also leading
to an architecture that is more streamlined than would be the case if the Commission’s
proposal became law. However, the paper also recognises that the more cooperative
approach does not resolve the enforcement gap at member state level, with only three
member states—Germany, Austria and the UK—currently having the capability under
national law to vet minority shareholdings, although it may spur others to act. Of
course, in the light of the referendum, the UK in the near future will no longer be a
member state of the EU.
1 European Commission White Paper COM (2014) 449 final.
2 Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 OJ L 024, pp. 1–22 (2004).
3 Supra n. 1, European Commission White Paper COM(2014) 449 final, Sects. 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.
4 Davison (2015, pp. 33–48).
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The Enforcement Gap
The current EUMR, which dates from 2004, gives the Commission exclusive power
to vet mergers notified to it but only if they meet certain conditions. It is one of these
conditions, the concentration condition, which means that the majority of minority
shareholdings with a potential Community competition concern do not fall within
the remit of EU merger control, and hence EU law. Specifically, the concentration
condition requires the acquisition of control whereby a person(s) or undertak-
ing(s) acquire control, on a lasting basis, over one or more other undertakings, or
parts thereof.5 Further, the aforesaid control must confer on the acquirer the
possibility of decisive influence over the target entity.6 The classic example of this
is when an undertaking acquires a majority shareholding which gives it the
necessary voting rights to control the acquired undertaking. The acquisition of
control under the 2004 EUMR also encompasses the situation when two
undertakings establish a joint venture which performs on a lasting basis all the
functions of an autonomous economic entity.7 However, what it fails to encompass
is the acquisition of a minority shareholding unrelated to control in the above sense,
even though the shareholding could have the ability to cause competitive harm.
In these cases, the Commission has no legal authority to investigate the matter on
competition grounds. The only exception to this relates to a merger notification to
the Commission concerning a separate acquisition of control. In such a notification,
the Commission can investigate a minority shareholding already held by a party to
the proposed merger, be it held in a competitor or acquired in an up-stream or down-
stream firm. However, this possibility is restricted by EU merger law to notified
concentrations that have been implemented (see below). Moreover, once a merger
has been approved under EU law, the Commission has no power to investigate
subsequent minority shareholdings acquired by the merged entity, even if they are
likely to give rise to competition concerns.
Hence it appears that there is an enforcement gap in relation to the aforesaid
minority shareholdings causing competitive harm at the EU level. This is also true at
the member state level. In fact, only three member states have acted to address this
form of competition concern within their own national merger control regimes,
specifically Austria, Germany and the UK,8 although the UK will soon not be a
member state. Outside the Union, the Commission notes that many jurisdictions,
such as the US, Canada and Japan, have the competence ‘‘to review similar
structural links under their respective merger control rules.’’9 However, the
Commission’s case for ending the aforesaid enforcement gap does not simply rest
on the fact that other jurisdictions have this competence and apply it, although this is
undoubtedly supportive of EU merger law being amended to encompass minority
5 Supra n. 2, Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 OJ L 024, (2004), Article 3.
6 Case T-411/07, Aer Lingus Group plc v European Commission, paragraph 63.
7 Supra n. 2, Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 OJ L 024, (2004), Recital 20.
8 European Commission Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014) 221 final, paragraph 47.
9 Supra n. 8, European Commission Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014) 221 final,
paragraph 47.
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share acquisitions with a potential Community competition concern. Nor does it
purely rest upon economic theory, which demonstrates how minority shareholdings
are causally linked to various forms of competitive harm. The Commission’s case
also crucially rests upon actual EU and member state cases which evidence the
existence of the said competition concern at the EU level,10 and hence the need to
address this enforcement gap. The paper also adopts this approach.
Economic theory demonstrates that the acquisition of control in a merger is
causally linked to at least three forms of competitive harm: unilateral effects,
coordinated effects and vertical effects. It has been asserted that the same holds true
for certain minority shareholdings as well. In general, unilateral or non-coordinated
effects, as the term suggests, arise from the merged entity having the ability, for
example, to increase price and/or reduce choice based on its own market power.
However, the unilateral effect is not just about the merged entity increasing price
but also whether this increase leads to price increases on the part of competitors as
they respond to the increased demand caused by consumers switching to them on
account of the said price increase by the concentration.11 In the case of a minority
shareholding in a rival, the unilateral effect could arise when the shareholding
enables the acquirer to materially influence the Board of the other company—say in
respect of strategic decisions concerning the raising of capital and/or in terms of
joint ventures or other forms of collaboration with third companies—which weaken
its ability to compete effectively.12
A merger in an oligopolistic market, especially if the actions of the players in the
market are transparent, and therefore quickly knowable, may increase the likelihood
of coordinated anti-competitive effects. The absorption of the rival, reducing the
number and relative strength of remaining competitors, as well as the said market
transparency, may change the dynamic so that the incentive to coordinate behaviour
transcends the willingness to engage in competitive rivalry. Such coordination may
manifest as an explicit agreement between firms but it may also take the form of
tacit collusion. Similarly, an undertaking acquiring a significant minority share-
holding in a close competitor could increase the ability and willingness of the two
involved undertakings to explicitly or tacitly engage in coordinated behaviour—
particularly if the minority shareholding gave the acquirer access to the commercial
secrets of its rival—so as to maximise profitability.13 Of course, should the target
undertaking seek to deviate from the said collusive behaviour, the minority
shareholding may enable the acquirer to punish its rival and weaken its effectiveness
as a competitor.
The aforesaid unilateral and coordinated anti-competitive effects are more
associated with horizontal mergers where the firms had been competitors at the
same level in an industry. Yet anti-competitive effects can also arise from vertical
10 Supra n. 8, European Commission Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014) 221 final,
Sect. 3.1.1.
11 ICN Report on Merger Guidelines (2004) Chapter 3 April 2004, Sect. 1.2. http://www.
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc561.pdf.
12 Supra n. 8, Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014) 221 final, paragraph 51.
13 Supra n. 8, Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014) 221 final, paragraph 58.
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mergers, where the merger takes place between complementary undertakings, one
downstream and the other upstream in an industry (an electricity generator and a
distributor, for example). A concern here is that the merger could lead to either input
or customer foreclosure.14 The former is when an undertaking acquires a
downstream supplier and then limits or prevents the supplier selling inputs to the
acquirer’s rivals. The latter is when the acquired upstream company is no longer
allowed to be a customer of the acquirer’s competitors. Likewise, acquiring a
significant minority shareholding in either an upstream or downstream undertaking
could give the acquirer the ability and incentive to seek, respectively, customer
foreclosure or input foreclosure regarding competitors.
Ryanair/Aer Lingus and Other Cases
Of course, using economic theory to demonstrate that certain minority sharehold-
ings can theoretically lead to competitive harm is one thing; using EU and national
competition cases is another. The latter are important for several reasons: in
confirming the limited scope of the EUMR in relation to the said minority
shareholdings; in demonstrating how these shareholdings are able in practice to
cause competitive harm at the EU level; and in establishing that the enforcement
gap at the EU level is not just a theoretical possibility but a reality. This in turn
supports the Commission having powers under an amended EUMR to vet such
cases, thereby ending the stated gap. Within this context, the Ryanair/Aer Lingus
case is arguably the most prominent example of a minority shareholding giving rise
to horizontal unilateral effects of competitive harm.15
Ryanair started buying a substantial number of Aer Lingus shares on the 27th
September 2006 and by the 5th October 2006 it held a 19.1% stake in its rival.16 On
that same day, Ryanair announced its intention to make a public bid for the
remainder of Aer Lingus’s share capital,17 which, if successful, would give Ryanair
control of its rival. As part of its plan to acquire control, Ryanair continued to
purchase shares during the bid period. Therefore, the Commission treated Ryanair’s
shareholding bought just prior to and during the bid process and the public bid itself
as a single concentration under EU merger law.18 Moreover, because the public bid
would give the proposed merger a community dimension, as it met certain sales
thresholds as specified by the EUMR,19 Ryanair was required to notify the
concentration with the Commission, which it did on the 30th November 2006. In the
meantime, Ryanair continued to purchase shares in its rival so that it held 25.17%
14 Miguel de la Mano Vertical and Conglomerate Effects undated Chief Economist Team, European
Commission, slide 11. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/delamoni.pdf.
15 Koppenfels (2015, p. 13).
16 Competition Commission Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus Group plc 28 August 2013, Summary,
paragraph 4.
17 Ibid n. 12, p. 11.
18 Commission Decision of 27/06/2007 Case No COMP/M. 4439 – Ryanair/Aer Lingus, paragraph 12.
19 Supra n. 2, Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 OJ L 024, (2004), Article 1.
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by the 28th November 2006,20 and this remained the position until August 2007. In
June 2007, the Commission, on competition grounds, prohibited the merger as
incompatible with the common market.
The Commission prohibited Ryanair’s takeover of Aer Lingus because it would
have led to the creation of a monopoly or high market shares (above 60%) on routes
between 35 European destinations and Ireland21 that would have significantly
impeded effective competition, especially as on many of these routes the two
airlines were the competitive constraint on each other. However, the issue of
Ryanair’s minority shareholding remained, also the claim by Aer Lingus that it
caused significant unilateral negative effects on competition between the two
rivals,22 and, because of these claimed effects, it wanted to know if the Commission
had the power to order Ryanair to divest or dissolve this shareholding. In fact, in the
prohibition decision, the Commission had not investigated the minority share issue,
precisely because it believed it lacked the power to do so under EU merger law.23
Aer Lingus brought the matter before the EU’s General Court (GC), whose ruling of
the 6th July 2010 was supportive of the Commission’s interpretation of the law.
The GC confirmed that the Commission’s regulatory power is restricted to
concentrations as defined by EU law. More precisely, a concentration is deemed to
exist when there is a change of control on a lasting basis, which confers the
possibility of exercising decisive influence on the acquired, particularly in relation
to the strategic decisions of the latter.24 Therefore the Commission can only assess
minority shareholdings when associated with such a change of control. According to
the court, Ryanair’s minority shareholding, at the time of the Commission’s
decision, did not give rise to such a change, and hence the ability to have a decisive
influence.25 Moreover, given that the takeover was prohibited, it could not result in a
change of control on a long term basis. On this matter in relation to the minority
shareholding, the GC declared that, ‘‘from the moment when the decision finding…
was adopted, it was no longer possible for Ryanair, de jure or de facto, to exercise
control over Aer Lingus or to exercise decisive influence on the undertaking.’’26
However, the matter is more complicated than the above suggests, for it also
requires an understanding of the scope of dissolving share ownership within a
concentration under EU merger law, and this was addressed in the aforesaid case by
the GC. It ruled that the Commission has the power to require an undertaking to
dissolve a concentration through the divestment of shares purchased in the other
company, but only after the concentration has been deemed incompatible with the
common market and that it has also been implemented, so that the acquired
undertaking has ceased to be independent of the acquirer.27 The scale of the
20 Supra n. 14, COMP/M. 4439 – Ryanair/Aer Lingus, paragraph 11.
21 European Commission Press Release 1P/07/893 Brussels, 27th June 2007.
22 Supra n. 6, Case T-411/07, paragraph 46.
23 Supra n. 6, Case T-411/07, paragraph 19.
24 Supra n. 6, Case T-411/07, paragraph 63.
25 Supra n. 6, Case T-411/07, paragraph 69.
26 Supra n. 6, Case T-411/07, paragraph 61.
27 Supra n. 6, Case T-411/07, Paragraph 59.
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minority shareholding Ryanair held in Aer Lingus meant the implementation
condition was not satisfied—Ryanair never gained a controlling share interest, so in
that sense, Aer Lingus remained independent—and hence the Commission lacked
the power to dissolve the aforesaid minority shareholding. Despite the prohibition
decision, Ryanair has continued its efforts to acquire its rival, with its third attempt
being prohibited by the Commission on the 27th February 2013.28 On appeal before
the GC, Ryanair is seeking to have this prohibition annulled, and the case is still
pending.
UK law, contrary to the EUMR, does accept that a minority shareholding in itself
can have material influence on the target, which leads to competitive harm.29 In fact,
on the 5th June 2012, the UK’s Office of Fair Trading referred Ryanair’s minority
stake in Aer Lingus, which then stood at 29.82%, to the Competition Commission
(CC), now the Competition and Markets Authority, to determine whether it would
give Ryanair the power to materially influence (control) its rival, even though it
lacked a controlling share interest, and if so, whether it had led to, or was expected
to lead to, a substantial lessening of competition within markets in the UK
encompassing the provision of scheduled airline services on a number of direct
routes between the UK and Ireland.30
Indeed, with the CC answering in the affirmative to both questions, the case
provides an important exemplar of how a minority shareholding can give the
acquirer material influence that could cause unilateral competitive harm. In this
particular case, the CC concluded that the factors that would give Ryanair material
influence in respect of Aer Lingus’s commercial policy and strategy could also give
Ryanair the ability to use this influence to significantly lessen competition in the
said market. The CC believed that of particular importance among the factors which
could give Ryanair material influence was the airline’s ability to block special
resolutions at general meetings of Aer Lingus. This blocking power gave Ryanair
the ability to influence its rival’s commercial policy and strategy and this was
deemed by the CC to be especially important in respect of Aer Lingus’s ability to
combine with another airline (other than Ryanair) and to optimise its portfolio of
slots at Heathrow airport.31
The point concerning Aer Lingus’s ability to combine with a third airline was
that such a combination would boost scale and thereby reduce costs/improve
competitiveness, thus enabling Aer Lingus to become a more effective competitor to
Ryanair on the said routes. This, therefore, would not be in Ryanair’s interest, a
position reached by the CC.32 However, the aforesaid blocking powers gave Ryanair
the ability to impede or prevent such a cross-border merger with a third airline, as
28 European Commission Press Release Mergers: Commission prohibits Ryanair’s proposed takeover of
Aer Lingus Brussels, 27 February 2013.
29 Enterprise Act 2002, Chapter 1, 22(1), 23(1) and 26(3).
30 [2015] EWCA Civ 83 Case Number: 1219/4/813: [2014] CAT 3, paragraph 7.
31 Supra n. 12, Competition Commission Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus Group plc, paragraph
4.42.
32 Supra n. 12, Competition Commission Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus Group plc, paragraphs
7.179 and 7.178.
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well as Aer Lingus’s capability to make capital changes that might be needed to
acquire or merge with an airline other than Ryanair.33 Furthermore, the CC found
evidence that Ryanair’s minority shareholding itself made merging or a joint
venture with Aer Lingus less attractive to third airlines than would have been the
case without the shareholding.34
The CC determined that Ryanair’s incentive to carry out the aforesaid unilateral
behaviour largely stemmed from the fact that the two airlines were close
competitors, with Aer Lingus being Ryanair’s only competitor on a number of
the aforementioned routes, thereby providing the competitive constraint on Ryanair.
In other words, it was in Ryanair’s interest to use its minority shareholding to
weaken the effectiveness of its close rival concerning the routes in question.
Moreover, the CC argued that Ryanair had a further incentive to weaken its rival if
it made it easier to take over the company, bearing in mind that Ryanair’s declared
intention was to fully acquire Aer Lingus.35 The aforementioned helped the CC
reach the conclusion that the said minority shareholding had led or was expected to
lead to a substantial lessening of competition in the stated market.36 The remedy
required by the CC was that Ryanair must reduce its shareholding in Aer Lingus to
5%, not seek or accept Board representation or acquire further shares in its rival.37
This therefore would prevent Ryanair having material influence over Aer Lingus.
Fortunately—though not for Ryanair—the UK is one of a small number of
European countries whose regulator can vet such a minority shareholding on
competition grounds under its merger law. Yet it could only vet the flights between
Ireland and the UK, and not the routes between Ireland and mainland Europe on
which Ryanair and Aer Lingus competed. In other words, this suggests that the case
had a potential Community competition concern and that possibly the Commission
would be the more appropriate regulator to make the assessment. Of course, and as
already noted, the current EU merger law would not allow this.
However, EU merger law has allowed the vetting of minority shareholdings when
linked to separate concentrations that have been notified to the Commission and, in
some instances, the minority shareholdings have raised or contributed to vertical,
unilateral or coordinated effects of competitive harm. One such shareholding, which
potentially could have led to vertical input foreclosure regarding the only non-
propriety technology for melamine production, was associated with IPIC’s
(International Petroleum Investment Company) acquisition of MAN Ferrostaal.
IPIC’s subsidiary AMI (Agrolinz Melamine International) was a high grade
melamine producer whose main rivals in the EU market were DSM and ZAP;
33 Supra n. 12, Competition Commission Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus Group plc, paragraph
7.32.
34 Supra n. 12, Competition Commission Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus Group plc, paragraph
7.80.
35 Supra n. 12, Competition Commission Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus Group plc, paragraph
7.20.
36 Supra n. 12, Competition Commission Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus Group plc, paragraph
7.188.
37 Supra n. 12, Competition Commission Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus Group plc, paragraph
8.121.
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however, unlike DSM and AMI, ZAP and smaller producers lacked their own
propriety technology.38 Eurotecnica was the licensor of the only non-propriety
high—pressure technology available39 and MAN Ferrostaal held a 30% stake in the
company which, if the concentration was approved, would belong to IPIC.
The Commission concluded that the 30% stake would give IPIC both the ability
and the incentive for input foreclosure of Eurotecnica’s said technology to AMI’s
competitors.40 This ability stemmed in part from Eurotecnica’s majority voting
provisions that, going beyond the normal scope to protect minority rights,41 IPIC
could invoke to influence Eurotecnica’s licensing of the said technology to AMI’s
rivals,42 potentially limiting their capacity expansion or deterring entry,43 or
requiring them to enter a joint venture with AMI. Furthermore, the Commission
determined that the minority shareholding was likely to have a substantial deterrent
effect on potential licensees as they would have to provide Eurotecnica with
‘‘voluminous information’’44 that could end up in the hands of their rival, AMI.
The Commission declared that the incentive to foreclose was premised on
whether it would increase profitability for IPIC.45 The Commission estimated that it
would, with the loss of profit to IPIC from Eurotecnica’s foreclosure of its
technology licensing in the upstream market being more than matched by the
resulting extra profit gained by AMI in the downstream market for melamine. This
was because the upstream profit loss was relatively small, given that the return on
each project would be rather limited; moreover, IPIC’s share would only be a
fraction of this loss, based on its 30% stake in Eurotecnica.46 In contrast, the
downstream profit gain could be significant on account of AMI’s large presence in
the market combined with the impact of the said upstream foreclosure47: the impact
being a reduction of potential competitors in the downstream market, enabling AMI
to increase either price or sales.
The Commission determined that similar but coordinated effects were likely
from the creation of a symmetrically dominant duopoly in the German wholesale
electricity market, arising from the merger of VEBA and VIAG, notified to the
Commission, and the merger of RWE and VEW, which was vetted under German
merger law by the Bundeskartellamt. A contributing factor or structural link
facilitating coordination was the duopoly’s holding of controlling and non-
controlling shareholdings in other regional and local power concerns, leading the
Commission to conclude that ‘‘Meaningful competition is not therefore to be
38 Commission Decision 13.03.2009 Case No COMP/M. 5406 – IPIC/MAN FERROSTAAL AG,
paragraph 30.
39 Ibid n. 34, paragraph 34.
40 Ibid n. 34, paragraph 47.
41 Ibid n. 34, paragraph 37.
42 Ibid n. 34, paragraph 38.
43 Ibid n. 34, paragraph 41.
44 Ibid n. 34, paragraph 39.
45 Ibid n. 34, paragraph 43.
46 Supra n. 34, paragraph 45.
47 Supra n. 34, paragraph 45.
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expected from these interconnected power companies.’’48 Hence, in order to give
approval to the VEBA/VIAG merger, the Commission sought the divestment of
many of these shareholdings, both to reduce the likelihood of coordination and to
encourage and enable competition in the sector. An exemplar of this was the
position of VEAG, with RWE Energie AG holding 26.52% of its shares, VEBA
26.25% and VIAG22.5%.49 The Commission therefore sought the divestment of
these three minority shareholdings, dissolving a link between the said companies
that potentially encouraged parallel behaviour and, of course, enabled VEAG to
become an independent competitor.50
These cases evidence the need for minority shareholdings with a potential
Community competition concern to be vetted under a suitably amended EUMR,
thereby ending this particular enforcement gap. The next section examines such a
proposal put forward by the Commission.
The Commission’s Proposal
In order to be able to vet minority shares causing competitive harm at the EU level,
the Commission has proposed to incorporate this capability into an amended
EUMR. In other words, the vetting of the aforesaid minority shareholdings would fit
into the already established architecture of separate jurisdictional zones which has
underpinned the EU merger control regime from when it became law in 1990.51 Its
amendment in 199752 and the current 2004 EUMR have sought to improve the
working of the architecture in practice. The architecture of separate jurisdictional
zones requires those mergers—and, if the Commission’s proposal became law,
those minority share holdings—with a potential cross-border or Community
competition concern to be vetted under EU law, while those with a potential
competition concern isolated within a national market would be the responsibility of
the relevant member state. Moreover, as is the position now for EU merger cases,
future minority shareholdings caught under EU law would be vetted by the
Commission alone, subject to review by EU courts.
Therefore the architecture of separate jurisdictional zones appears to meet the
valued one-stop shop approach whereby a case is vetted either by EU or member
state law but not by both, so that the involved parties do not face the burden and
uncertainty of multiple regulatory notification and assessment. Moreover, the
architecture appears to satisfy the EU’s subsidiarity principle as it seems to
guarantee that a case with a potential EU competition concern comes under EU law
and is vetted by the Commission, while those with an isolated competition concern
within a member state will be vetted under that state’s law. Furthermore, the
architecture appears to meet the Commission’s more appropriate authority goal,
48 Commission Decision of 13 June 2000 Case No COMP/M. 1673-VEBA/VIAG, paragraph 96.
49 Ibid n. 44, paragraph 215.
50 Ibid n. 44, paragraph 229.
51 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 OJ L 395, pp. 1–12, Article 25. (1989).
52 Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 OJ L 180, pp. 1–6. (1997).
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whereby the Commission’s Competition Directorate, having the resources and
experience, vets the major cross-border cases while a national regulator, with its
local expertise and knowledge, vets this type of case.
The Commission’s proposed amendments, which would see the EUMR gaining a
new capability in respect of the said minority shareholdings, are unsurprisingly in
tune with the architecture of separate jurisdictional zones. Indeed, given this, it was
to be expected that the three principles concerning the design and operation of this
new capability, put forward in the 2014 White Paper, Towards more effective EU
merger control (hereafter the 2014 White Paper) substantially reflect or fit in with
this architecture. The first principle requires that operationally this new capability
must be able to capture minority shareholdings which have the potential to cause
competitive harm at the EU level,53 and therefore are to be vetted under EU law; the
second principle requires that the administrative requirements associated with the
new capability should be neither unnecessary nor disproportionately burdensome for
either the companies involved, the Commission or national competition authorities
(NCAs)54; and the third principle requires that the working of this capability must fit
with the merger control regimes currently in place at the EU and member state
levels,55 in line with the above mentioned architecture.
Of course, for the architecture of separate jurisdictional zones and principles one
and three to work in practice, an accurate jurisdictional subsidiarity test is
necessary. The EUMR has two primary jurisdictional subsidiarity tests,56 termed the
Community Dimension tests (CD tests), and if a merger is caught by either CD test,
it is deemed to have a potential Community competition concern and hence comes
under EU law. Those merger cases that are not caught by either of the two CD tests
are deemed to lack a Community impact and are therefore of member state interest.
However, past experience has revealed that the two CD tests, on account of their
form-based numerical nature, lack the diagnostic sensitivity to almost always
capture those mergers with a potential Community competition concern, and some
of the merger cases they have caught turned out to have not a Community but a
member state competition concern.57 Such misallocation—hence termed the
misallocation problem—therefore inverts the principle of subsidiarity and runs
counter to the Commission’s more appropriate authority goal. Moreover, some of
the missed merger cases with a potential Community concern have then notified
with two or more national merger regimes which runs counter to the one-stop shop
approach. In fact, the Commission has not only acknowledged the existence of this
misallocation problem but, through the use of two referral mechanisms—the pre and
post-notification correctives (see below)—has also sought to prevent misallocation
or have the merger cases correctly reallocated.
Yet despite the CD tests’ deficiency as an accurate allocative system, the
Commission’s proposal for an amended EUMR would see their employment as a
53 Supra n. 1, European Commission White Paper COM (2014) 449 final, paragraph 42.
54 Supra n. 1, European Commission White Paper COM (2014) 449 final, paragraph 42.
55 Supra n. 1, European Commission White Paper COM (2014) 449 final, paragraph 42.
56 Supra n. 2, Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 OJ L 024, pp. 1–22 (2004), Article 1.
57 For a fuller treatment see: Davison (2015, pp. 31–46) supra n. 4.
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jurisdictional test when determining the allocation of minority shareholding cases to
either EU or member state law, but only as the first part in a two part jurisdictional
sequence to determine which minority shareholdings have a potential Community
competition concern. In other words, the 2014 White Paper recognises that a second
jurisdictional test, operating in conjunction with the CD tests, is a necessity to judge
more accurately which minority shareholding cases have a Community concern.
Procedurally, therefore, minority share cases satisfying one of the two CD tests
would not, as is usual in similar merger cases, automatically notify with the
Commission; but instead the involved parties (the acquirer and target) would face a
‘‘competitively significant link’’58 assessment to determine if the case had a
potential Community competition concern, in line with principle one.
This assessment is at the heart of what the Commission terms the targeted
transparency system, with a competitively significant link requiring the meeting of two
elements. First, and shaped by the aforementioned theories of competitive harm and
the past experience of the Commission and NCAs, a strong competitive link between
the acquirer and the target is a necessity, be it horizontal or vertical.59 Second, to help
ensure that this link is indeed significant in these cases, only minority shareholdings of
around 20% or above, or between 5 and 20% but tied to associated factors which give
the acquirer special rights such as a blocking veto on board decisions, a seat on the
board of directors or access to business sensitive information, will meet the
jurisdictional test.60 The importance of these factors in enabling the acquirer to
achieve decisive influence over its target has already been demonstrated and clearly
such channels of influence can be just as important for minority shareholdings of 20%
or above as they are for those between 5 and 20%. Holding below 5% is viewed as a
safe harbour, with such minority shareholdings not being viewed as a competitively
significant link and therefore falling outside the jurisdictional capture of the test.61
Under the proposed targeted transparency system, the potential acquirer has to
decide if the minority shareholding qualifies as a competitively significant link and,
if so, would be legally required to submit an information notice to the Competition
Directorate.62 The notice has two important dimensions. First, it would enable the
Competition Directorate to determine whether further investigation of the proposed
transaction was warranted, and, if it was, then the concerned parties would have to
submit a full notification (i.e., submit a full Form CO). Second, as the information
notice would be communicated to member states, it would enable a member state to
action a referral request if appropriate (see below). In addition to this, the
Commission was also considering a fifteen working day waiting period once an
information notice had been submitted, during which the proposed transaction
would be on standstill and therefore could not be implemented.63 Of course—such
58 Supra n. 1, European Commission White Paper COM (2014) 449 final, paragraphs 45 and 46.
59 Supra n. 1, European Commission White Paper COM (2014) 449 final, paragraph 47.
60 Supra n. 1, European Commission White Paper COM (2014) 449 final, paragraph 47.
61 Supra n. 8, European Commission Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014) 221 final,
paragraph 79.
62 Supra n. 1, European Commission White Paper COM (2014) 449 final, paragraph 49.
63 Supra n. 1, European Commission White Paper COM (2014) 449 final, paragraph 50.
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as in a case when a minority shareholding fails to submit the required information
notice, and irrespective of whether or not it has been implemented—the
Commission could initiate an investigation or respond to complaints.64
As its name indicates, and as the Commission intended, the targeted transparency
system is highly transparent and targeted in line with the above-stated three
principles. If notification was simply based upon meeting one of the two CD tests, as
is the case with mergers (unless the pre-notification referral mechanism is
triggered), then it would be highly transparent but not sufficiently targeted, as the
tests would capture all types of minority shareholdings—including those that lacked
a competitively significant link, as well as some whose competition concern was
within a member state—and therefore not just those that had a potential Community
competition concern. Moreover, in capturing all types of cases, a pointless
administrative burden would be placed both on those aforesaid minority
shareholdings that obviously lacked a Community competition concern and on
the Commission, whose resources would be wasted in reviewing these cases to
reach a conclusion that no such concern existed. This, of course, runs counter to
principle two, which aims to avoid such unnecessary burdensome administrative
tasks.
This is intentionally not the situation with the targeted transparency system.
Specifically, the two elements of the competitively significant link test are
transparent as well as designed to work together to target and capture primarily
those minority shareholding cases with a Community competition concern (in line
with principle one) and thereby eliminate needless administrative tasks related to
those not deemed suitable for capture, and of course the Commission will not have
to review them (in line with principle two). In addition, and again in line with
principle two, those cases that meet a CD test and satisfy the competitively
significant link test will complete an information notice that is pared down to the
essential information that the Commission needs to determine whether the case
requires further investigation under EU merger procedures.65 If so, then the parties
will have to complete the more informationally demanding Form CO. Such cases, in
satisfying the said jurisdictional tests, would therefore be vetted under EU law. Of
course some of those not caught under EU law may still be captured by those
member states that have a minority shares component as part of their merger
regimes and hence be dealt with under their respective law (in line with principle
three). This therefore appears supportive not only of the valued one-stop shop
approach but also of the EU’s principle of subsidiarity and the Commission’s more
appropriate authority goal.
Yet the Commission’s proposal regarding minority shareholdings is not concern-
free in relation to its operational effectiveness. One concern is whether the proposed
pared down information notice—pared down in terms of the range and depth of
information required from the involved parties—would provide the Commission
with the information it required to be able to determine if a case warranted further
investigation and which a member state required to reach a conclusion as to whether
64 Supra n. 1, European Commission White Paper COM (2014) 449 final, paragraph 51.
65 Supra n. 1, European Commission White Paper COM (2014) 449 final, paragraph 57.
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or not to request referral to its jurisdiction. The Commission must therefore ensure
that the information notice does indeed provide all the required information. A
possibly more significant concern is regarding the operational ability of the
proposed two stage jurisdictional tests to fulfil their function. The concern is
twofold: first, that the tests will capture not only minority shareholdings with a
Community competition concern, but also a few that have an isolated competition
concern within a member state; second, that they will miss some minority
shareholdings that have a potential Community competition concern.
The Commission has estimated that between twenty and thirty minority share
cases per year will be caught by the CD tests and the competitively significant link
test,66 and if this turns out to be accurate, it is likely that a small number of these
would have a purely national competition concern and therefore should be dealt
with at the national level under member state law. This relatively small scale matter
is recognised by both the 2014 White Paper and the associated Commission Staff
Working Document and their common solution is that a decentralisation corrective
would apply in these cases (the latter explicitly states it is the Article 9 EUMR
referral route67), whereby a member state, acting on the information notice provided
by the parties, would request referral to its jurisdiction. This process would not add
any further administrative burden on the parties providing the information notice
and therefore is in line with principle two. Moreover, the proposed fifteen working
days waiting period (see above) would also act as the time period within which a
request for referral could be made. Furthermore, as the referral cases are not
implemented, the NCAs will not face the potential problem of unscrambling them.
Thus, in line with principle three, the operation of the referral mechanism is
intended to fit with and support member state merger regimes.
However, and this is understood by the Commission, the referral system is only
operable with the three member states whose merger regimes allow the capture of
minority share cases—Germany, Austria, and currently the UK. Thus, the system is
flawed in that the majority of NCAs are not in a position to make referral requests.
Given this, will the Commission vet these cases that should be decentralised if this
were possible, or are they to go unregulated? The former, of course, runs counter to
principle three, the principle of subsidiarity, and fails to sit with the current
interpretation of the more appropriate authority goal; but this may be more
acceptable than the latter which is the failure to regulate. Indeed, this is the position
taken by the more cooperative approach, as explained below.
The above relates to minority share cases caught by the two stage jurisdictional
tests but which have an isolated national competition concern. However, past
experience in relation to merger cases reveals that the more serious issue was the
volume of cases with a potential Community competition concern that were missed
by the two CD tests, often for them to be vetted by two or more NCAs under their
respective domestic law, running counter to the one-stop shop approach and the
66 Supra n. 8, European Commission Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014) 221 final,
paragraph 85.
67 Supra n. 8, European Commission Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014) 221 final,
paragraph 83.
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principle of subsidiarity. This too could be a serious issue in relation to minority
shareholdings, although neither the 2014 White Paper nor the associated Commis-
sion Staff Working Document estimate the likely scale of the problem. However,
the outcome would be different from that of mergers in this situation, because as the
great majority of member states have no capability in the field of minority
shareholdings, many would escape vetting at this level, having already been
wrongly missed at the EU level.
Of course, a few of the aforesaid minority shareholdings with a potential
Community competition concern but missed by the CD tests might be caught by one
or more of the three member states that have the necessary vetting capability under
their domestic law. Although this runs contrary to principle one and the subsidiarity
principle, the Commission has not proposed a preventative or corrective to ensure
that these cases are duly vetted under EU law by the Competition Directorate. This
might be viewed as puzzling, for not only has the Commission advocated the Article
9 EUMR decentralisation corrective for minority shareholdings with a member state
competition concern caught by the CD tests and the competitively significant link
assessment, but it also has considerable experience in pioneering centralisation
referral mechanisms, in particular the post-notification Article 22 EUMR route and
the pre-notification 4(5) EUMR route in respect of mergers.
The material point is that the more cooperative approach, unlike the Commis-
sion’s proposal, would guarantee that virtually all mergers and minority sharehold-
ings with a potential Community competition concern would be vetted under EU
law, and that the need for the current EUMR referral mechanisms would be ended.
The next section therefore turns its attention to the more cooperative alternative.
The Original, More Cooperative Alternative
As the paper argues for the recently proposed more cooperative approach in respect
of mergers68 to be extended and modified to encompass minority shareholdings,
creating an integrated approach to the regulation of both at the EU level, it is
necessary to articulate the key workings of this approach as originally proposed for
mergers, and hence why it should be adopted. It will be seen that the more
cooperative approach does not in fact replace the architecture of separate
jurisdictional zones but aims to make it more operationally effective in relation
to mergers. Specifically, by nearly eliminating the misallocation problem and
associated issues, it would be supportive of the principle of subsidiarity, the one-
stop shop and a reinterpreted more appropriate authority goal. A further positive is
that the need for cumbersome referral correctives is brought to an end, thereby
streamlining the working of the said architecture. Thereafter, in the following
section, it will be explained why the more cooperative approach has to be modified,
whilst retaining a high level of commonality with the original cooperative approach,
in order to create a system that will virtually guarantee that minority shareholdings
68 See Davison (2015) supra n, 4. See also Davison (2013, pp. 105–122).
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with a potential Community competition concern will be vetted under EU law and,
of course, the positives which flow from this.
Under the original, more cooperative approach, the retention of the two CD tests
may appear puzzling as they are the source of the misallocation problem that has
dogged the architecture of separate jurisdictional zones from the outset. In this
context, misallocation occurs when a merger with an isolated national competition
concern is not vetted under the law of the relevant member state but under EU law.
Similarly, misallocation occurs when a merger with a potential Community
competition concern is not vetted under EU law but under the national law of one or
more member states. However, the advantage of retaining the two CD tests is that
they have an acknowledged record of principally capturing merger cases with a
potential Community competition concern,69 which therefore should be vetted
under EU law. However, while the tests principally capture such cases, a few cases
with only a potential isolated national competition concern have also been caught
and centralised to Brussels and EU law, when they should be vetted under national
law. Even more worrying, however, is that the CD tests have failed to capture a
considerable volume of merger cases that had a potential Community competition
concern, which should been vetted under EU law but ended up under the law of one
or more member states, creating the so-called multiple notification issue.70
In fact, the misallocation problem was a direct consequence of the form-based
nature of the two CD tests. Because they are purely based on the merging parties
meeting or failing to meet specific sales turnover thresholds, including Community–
wide and global, the CD tests lack the necessary diagnostic capability to nearly
always accurately determine whether a merger has a potential Community or
national competition concern, and hence whether it should come under EU or
member state law.71 In addition, a small number of cases with a potential
Community concern were misallocated to member state level jurisdiction because
they met the two-thirds rule of the Community–wide sales turnover threshold, a
version of which is found in both tests.72 In the original or first CD test, for example,
even when the other thresholds for a CD are met, for a merger to become a national
concern, not only must two of the parties in the proposed merger each have a
Community-wide turnover that exceeds Euro 250 million but also two-thirds of this
turnover should be in one and the same member state.73
The misallocation problem is a serious matter because, in such cases, the
principle of subsidiarity is inverted and the Commission’s more appropriate
authority goal is not met. Moreover, in those cases with a potential Community
concern that have been missed by the tests, a significant number will face the cost
and burden of multiple notifications—and hence multiple investigations—at
member state level, which clearly runs counter to the one-stop shop approach.
69 European Commission Staff working paper {COM (2009) 281 final}/*SEC/2009/0808 final/2*/,
paragraphs 34 and 43.
70 Ibid n. 65, paragraphs 51–53.
71 Supra n. 4, Davision (2015, p. 36).
72 Supra n. 2, Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 OJ L 024, pp. 1–22 (2004), Article 1.
73 Supra n. 2, Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 OJ L 024, pp. 1–22 (2004), Article 1(2).
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Indeed, the Commission has taken the misallocation and notification problems so
seriously as to amend the architecture of separate jurisdictional zones twice, first in
1997 and again in 2004, in order to resolve these issues.
The 1997 amendment of the then European Merger Control Regulation (MCR)
saw the introduction of the second CD test and the completion of the post-
notification referral mechanism or corrective74: the second CD test to address—and
thus capture—those mergers with a potential Community competition concern
missed by the original CD test, and the post-notification referral mechanism to
correct any remaining misallocations made by the two CD tests. Specifically, the
Article 9 MCR referral route was designed to decentralise to member states cases
with only an isolated national competition concern that had been wrongly captured
by a CD test; while the Article 22 MCR referral route was to centralise to the
Commission mergers that had a potential Community competition concern which
had been missed by the two CD tests. In each, the referral request came from the
concerned member state(s). In practice, however, both the second CD test and the
post-notification corrective underperformed,75 and this was especially true in
respect of merger cases with a potential Community competition concern that had
been missed by the original CD test.
This underperformance was recognised by the Commission and its solution,
incorporated in the new 2004 EUMR,76 was the pre-notification corrective. As its
name suggests, the referral request, this time initiated by the merging entity itself,
takes place prior to notification with either the Commission or NCAs. Operating
prior to notification makes the pre-notification corrective the primary corrective,
with the post-notification sweeping up cases that the former had missed, and this
was the Commission’s intention. Moreover, it would be wrong to state that the pre-
notification corrective has not prevented the misallocation of some merger cases.77
However, it is also equally clear that the misallocation problem is far from resolved,
particularly in relation to merger cases lacking a CD but having a potential
Community competition concern.78 A factor behind this is that the referral request
under both the pre and post- notification correctives is not mandatory but voluntary.
Moreover, the Commission has found that some merging entities did not use the
pre-notification corrective because of the mechanism’s cumbersome and time-
consuming nature.79 Furthermore, the specification of the jurisdictional test
contained within the Article 4(5) centralisation route of the pre-notification
corrective meant that some merger cases with a potential Community competition
but lacking a CD fell outside the reach of the corrective.80
74 Supra n. 48, Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 OJ L 180, pp. 1–6. (1997), Article 9 and 22.
75 Supra n. 4, Davison (2015, pp. 38–39).
76 Supra n. 2, Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 OJ L 024, pp. 1–22 (2004), Article 4(4) and 4(5).
77 Supra n. 65, European Commission Staff working paper {COM (2009) 281 final}, paragraph 122.
78 Supra n. 65, European Commission Staff working paper {COM (2009) 281 final}, paragraphs
124–125. See also Davison (2015, pp. 40–41).
79 Supra n. 65, European Commission Staff working paper {COM (2009) 281 final}, paragraph 123.
80 Supra n. 4, Davison (2015, pp. 40–41).
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The goal of the original more cooperative approach is to virtually eliminate the
misallocation problem and associated concerns in respect of mergers, and in so
doing, to streamline the architecture of separate jurisdictional zones by removing
the need for the existing unwieldy correctives. For the aforesaid goal to be achieved,
the more cooperative approach would require the following three linked changes to
the current architecture of separate jurisdictional zones: a three or more member
state notification rule, a new effects-based jurisdictional subsidiarity test,81 and the
ability of national regulators to apply EU merger law in limited circumstances.
Arguably, a fourth change is the Commission having a very restricted power to vet
merger cases with an isolated national competition concern under EU law; in fact,
this already happens from time to time under the 2004 EUMR.
It has already been noted that a few of the mergers caught by the two CD tests
lack a potential Community competition concern but instead have one that is
isolated within a national market. Hence, and in line with the principle of
subsidiarity, they should be decentralised to the national law of the relevant member
state to be vetted. However, under the more cooperative approach such decentral-
isation will no longer happen because, given the small number of cases which are
with Brussels anyway, it is more convenient for the Commission to vet them under
EU law rather than to employ the cumbersome and time-consuming decentralisation
correctives.82 Indeed, this has the positive benefit of reducing the demand for the
decentralisation routes of the pre and post-notification correctives, respectively
Article 9 and Article 4(4) EUMR. This will also guarantee the one-stop shop
approach in these cases.
Moreover, it is important to note that the Competition Directorate has the
capability to vet the said merger cases. Because it has a history of vetting mergers
that impact on a wide part or all of the Union, and thus national markets therein, the
Directorate has the required experienced specialists to vet the stated mergers. Yet,
when vetting such a case, the Directorate should consider seeking assistance from
the relevant NCA. Indeed, such cooperation is to be encouraged, as the NCA’s local
experience and knowledge should complement that of the Directorate, thereby
aiding effective decision-making and hence the protection of competition. Such
cooperation therefore represents a reinterpretation of the Commission’s more
appropriate authority goal83 and it could represent the first step toward a formalised
cooperative architecture, delivering more effective decision-making than is the case
under the current architecture of separate jurisdictional zones. The cooperation
theme is further explored in the conclusion of this paper.
This then leaves the more serious problem of merger cases with a potential
Community competition concern but lacking a CD being misallocated to member
state law. The great majority of these cases are simply not caught by the two CD
tests but a few are the result of the operation of the above explained two-thirds rule.
In a recent review, the Commission found that, although the majority of mergers
81 In fact Davison (2015, p.41) would employ the distinct market test as this jurisdictional test. It has the
necessary effects based capabilities to carry out this function.
82 Supra n. 4, Davison (2015, pp. 41–42).
83 Supra n. 4, Davison (2015, p. 42).
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decentralised under the two-thirds rule had a competition concern that was of
national interest, a few had a potentially significant Community competition
concern.84 Under the more cooperative approach, the latter will now be vetted under
EU law, following EU merger procedures, not by Brussels, but as part of an NCA’s
limited ability to apply this law. Similarly, mergers that lack a CD but which have a
potential Community competition concern and have been notified with one or two
NCAs will be vetted under EU law, again by a national regulator following the said
procedures. This is in line with the principle of subsidiarity and it will also end a
major source of the misallocation problem. Moreover, as these cases will no longer
be misallocated, they will not require either the Article 4(5) or Article 22 EUMR
centralisation routes.
To ensure the above happens in practice, all mergers decentralised by the two-
thirds rule or notified to one or two national merger regimes would mandatorily be
assessed by an effects-based test, like the distinct market test, to guarantee that cases
with a Community competition concern are vetted under EU law, and those with an
isolated national concern are dealt with under member state law. Moreover, during
the 25 working days allowed for this initial assessment, echoing the time-period
allowed for such investigations under EU merger law, the application of national
law would be suspended.85 This assessment is likely to lead to one of three
outcomes. First—and this will probably apply to the majority of cases—no
appreciable competition concern is found and the merger is deemed compatible with
the common market and member state law. Second, an isolated national competition
concern is found and the case is therefore vetted under the law of the relevant
member state. Third, mergers with a cross-border competition concern will be
vetted under EU law using EU merger procedures.
This therefore leaves those mergers which lack a CD but have a potential
Community competition concern that are notified to three or more national merger
regimes to have their misallocation resolved by the more cooperative approach. The
solution, albeit an imperfect one, is the three or more member state notification rule,
which has previously been advocated by the Commission itself,86 reflecting its
position that such a scale of notification indicates the likelihood that these mergers
have a significant Community competition concern. Therefore a merger notified to
at least three national merger regimes would be mandatorily centralised to Brussels
and EU law.87 Moreover, not only is this in line with the principle of subsidiarity but
it also means that these mergers would now face a one-stop shop approach, ending
what otherwise would have been the uncertainty and cost arising from multiple
investigations at member state level. Furthermore, as these mergers relate to markets
that are wider than national, often EU-wide, and occasionally global, their
investigation is more suited to the expertise and experience of the Competition
84 Supra n. 65, European Commission Staff working paper {COM (2009) 281 final}, paragraph 68.
85 Supra n. 4, Davison (2015, p. 45).
86 See, for example, the Green Paper on the review of the merger regulation COM(96) 19 final,
31.1.1996, paragraphs 78–80.
87 Supra n. 4, Davison (2015, p. 43).
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Directorate, rather than an NCA, thereby satisfying the revised, more appropriate
authority goal.
Furthermore, the very fact that the rule would centralise the aforesaid cases
means that the Article 4(5) and Article 22 EUMR centralisation routes would not be
required in relation to this type of merger. In fact, in such cases, the adoption of the
rule would streamline the working of the architecture, as a mandatory and automatic
system would replace those that are voluntary and cumbrous. Indeed, combined
with the fact that cases under the two-thirds rule and those caught by one or two
national merger regimes will no longer be misallocated, the rule would bring to an
end the need for the Article 4(5) and Article 22 EUMR centralisation referral routes.
Yet the three or more member state rule is a less than a perfect solution because a
few of the centralised cases may only have an isolated national competition concern,
and hence should be vetted under the relevant member state law. However, as in the
few similar cases caught by the CD tests, and based on the same grounds of
convenience and capability, they will be vetted by the Competition Directorate
under EU law,88 accepting that this runs counter to the principle of subsidiarity,
although it is supportive of the one-stop shop approach as well as the reinterpreted
more appropriate authority goal. Of course it also means that such cases would not
require the Article 4(4) and Article 9 EUMR decentralisation referral routes; indeed,
they would be redundant. In fact, this brings to an end the need for the current
EUMR correctives.
Extending a Modified Cooperative Approach to Minority Shareholdings
It is revealed in this section that a modified cooperative approach, rather than the
proposal advanced by the Commission, is the more effective solution in terms of
capturing and regulating minority shareholdings with a potential Community
competition concern, thereby ending this enforcement gap. Specifically, the more
cooperative approach, operating within the established architecture of separate
jurisdictional zones, will guarantee that virtually all these cases are vetted under EU
law, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. This therefore prevents the situation
that would otherwise arise if the Commission’s proposal became law: a number of
these cases would be missed by the CD tests and therefore either avoid jurisdictional
vetting entirely or be misallocated to the national law of one or more of the three
member states that have this jurisdictional capability in respect of minority
shareholdings (UK, Germany and Austria). Moreover, it is made evident that the
design and operation of the modified cooperative approach is in tune with the
Commission’s three principles requirement, and it is further demonstrated that this
approach, like the original in respect of mergers, has no need of the current
cumbersome correctives.
The more cooperative approach concerning minority shareholdings is a modified
extension of the approach outlined in the previous section concerning mergers.
Hence, this approach to minority shareholdings is not standalone but intentionally
88 Supra n. 4, Davison (2015, p. 44).
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fits as part of an integrated architecture which encompasses both mergers and
minority shareholdings. Therefore, because this is an integrated architecture and
because the more cooperative approach to minority shareholdings is an extension to
that proposed for mergers, they share a high degree of commonality. However, the
modifications to the minority shareholdings approach, designed to enhance its
operational effectiveness, mean that there are some differences too. The high degree
of commonality lies in the fact that both would employ the two CD tests, enable
national regulators to employ EU law in similar limited circumstances and have a
three or more member state centralisation rule. A significant difference, however, is
that the minority shareholdings’ cooperative approach, as distinct from the case of
mergers, would adopt the Commission’s proposed competitively significant link
assessment to help ensure its effective working. Indeed, to be in a position to
guarantee that virtually all minority shareholdings with a potential Community
competition concern are vetted under EU law, both the Commission and NCAs
would be legally empowered to apply the competitively significant link assessment,
albeit in different circumstances.
Therefore, for a minority shareholding case to be vetted by Brussels, it has to
satisfy not only one of the two CD tests but also the competitively significant link
assessment, which has two elements. Reflecting economic theory and past
experience, the first element is targeted to ensure that only minority shareholding
cases with a potential competitive link, be it vertical or horizontal, are caught. The
second element seeks to guarantee the significance of the competitive link by
requiring that the acquirer has a minority shareholding in the target of around 20%
or above, or between 5 and 20% when tied to factors that enable the acquirer to have
decisive influence over the target. Thus the two elements operate together to meet
the Commission’s first principle, that those minority shareholdings captured should
have a potential Community competition concern. Moreover, as a result of the
exclusion of shareholdings that are unlikely to have such a concern, the companies
in question will not face any unnecessary administrative burden associated with
notification and investigation, in line with the second principle. A further positive is
that it also appears to be in tune with the principle of subsidiarity and the
reinterpreted more appropriate authority goal.
On the grounds of procedural simplicity, transparency and efficiency, minority
shareholdings satisfying a CD test and meeting the competitively significant link
assessment would face mandatory notification with the Commission, would not
implement the transaction, and would submit a completed revised Form CO;
revised, because the current form is necessarily focused on mergers, not minority
shareholdings. Clearly, the questions asked by the revised Form CO must be
carefully selected in order not only to provide the Competition Directorate (or
NCAs in certain circumstances) with the information it requires but also to
guarantee that the notifying parties do not face the needless burden of answering
unnecessary questions, which is in line with the second principle. The required
information would necessarily include the scale of the acquired shareholding and if
it involves a horizontal competitor or an upstream or downstream firm. In turn, this
further requires the notifying parties to provide information about the affected
markets before and after the proposed share acquisition, thereby helping the
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regulator to determine if the impact on competition is significant, and its
geographical scope. Moreover, so as to enable the making of a significance
assessment, the acquirer would be required to provide information on special rights
that accrue to it from the minority shareholding—such as a blocking veto on the
target’s Board—which might give it decisive or material influence over the target,
and hence the ability and incentive to engage in competitive harm.
Of course, and operating within the 25 working days allowed by EU procedures,
the Competition Directorate may find that a notified minority shareholding does
indeed have a significant competition concern but one that is isolated within a
national market. Clearly such cases have been misallocated and should be
decentralised to the relevant member state for vetting under their domestic law,
in line with the principle of subsidiarity. Yet the difficulty here is that the great
majority of member states currently lack this vetting capability and hence
decentralisation of cases to their NCAs is not a viable option, which in turn rather
undermines the point of having the Commission’s proposed Article 9 -type
decentralisation corrective. Hence, for cases where decentralisation is not feasible,
the only possibility for vetting them is if the Commission does this under EU law,
and as they are already with Brussels, this is what would happen under the more
cooperative approach. Given this, it is also logical for Brussels to vet the very few
cases that could be decentralised to the three member states that have the said
capability. Indeed, even if decentralisation were universally possible, given that the
number of these cases would be small, that they are already with Brussels and that
the decentralisation procedure is cumbrous, it would be more appropriate as well as
convenient if the Competition Directorate regulated them.
This then leaves the issue of minority shareholdings with a potential Community
competition concern that are either missed by the two CD tests or inappropriately
decentralised by the two-thirds rule. The Commission’s proposal is silent on
guaranteeing that these minority shareholdings would be assessed under EU law, in
line with the principle of subsidiarity and principle one. In fact, these shareholdings
would either not be vetted at all or would be misallocated to national law. The
former would happen if the concerned member state lacked the necessary domestic
legal capability to assess them, which is true of the great majority, while the latter
would be the case when the minority shareholdings were misallocated to the
national law of one or more of the three member states that have this vetting
capability. The strength of the modified cooperative approach, as is true of the
original in respect of mergers, is that virtually all these minority shareholdings
would in fact be vetted under EU law, and hence EU merger procedures, and this is
because of the cumulative effect of three key factors: all member states adopting the
stated competitively significant link test, NCAs to apply the amended EU law using
EU merger procedures89 in limited circumstances, and lastly the adoption of a three
or more member state centralisation rule.
89 There is undeniable logic in the fact that EU level merger and minority shareholding cases should
come under EU merger procedural rules, irrespective of whether the vetting regulator is the Commission
or an NCA. The benefit is that this helps to create a regulatory level playing field across the Union that is
supportive of the SEM. The alternative, when an NCA vets the aforesaid cases under EU law, is that
national rules are used, but, given that they differ from member state to member state, the outcome would
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In order to guarantee that minority shareholdings with a potential Community
competition concern that have been either missed by the two CD tests or are
decentralised by the two-thirds rule would be caught at the national level, each
member state would adopt the competitively significant link assessment as part of its
national merger regime. This is in addition to each member state, other than
Luxembourg, already having a sales thresholds test that to some degree reflects the
CD tests,90 although a key difference is that these national tests naturally focus upon
sales concerning the national territory of the state concerned, rather than the Union.
Hence, and like the two stage assessment the Commission would employ under this
approach, member states would capture the aforesaid minority shareholdings using
their respective thresholds test and the competitively significant link assessment.
Notification would then take place with the relevant NCA(s), and the transaction
would not be implemented. This then raises the question of whether it would be the
relevant NCA or the Competition Directorate that makes the assessment. Under the
cooperative approach, as is the case with mergers, a minority shareholding notifying
with one or two NCAs would be investigated by the relevant national regulator
under EU law. However, a minority shareholding notifying with three or more
member states would automatically be transferred to Brussels, and the Competition
Directorate would apply EU law (see below).
Hence, the competitively significant link assessment would not only meet the
Commission’s third principle that this assessment should fit with national merger
regimes, but would also play a crucial part in enabling a member state to fulfil its
limited role in the vetting of minority shareholdings with a potential Community
competition concern under EU law, in line with the principle of subsidiarity—
bearing in mind that these cases would otherwise be unregulated or misallocated to
national law. Moreover, as these minority shareholdings notifying with one or two
member states would now be correctly vetted under EU law by an NCA, their need
for an Article 22 or Article 4(5) type centralisation route would be redundant.
Furthermore, and importantly, the application of a standardised competitively
significant link assessment by all NCAs as well as the Commission would help
create a level playing field in respect of regulating the said minority shareholdings,
thereby supporting the SEM.
However, it is possible that a few of the aforesaid minority shareholdings still
may go unregulated, as notification under the UK merger regime, unlike that of any
other member state, is voluntary,91 not mandatory. Of course this would also be true
in respect of mergers with a potential Community competition concern in the same
situation. Arguably, this problem will be solved when the UK leaves the Union in
Footnote 89 continued
be divergence and fragmentation. Indeed, there is evidence of this in respect of decentralised Article 101
and 102 TFEU cases vetted by NCAs, precisely because the procedures and sanctions are largely gov-
erned by national law. See Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Com-
munication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Ten Years of Antitrust
Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives, SWD(2014) 231/2,
Sects. 3 and 4.
90 Slaughter and May (2016, Annex 1).
91 Slaughter and May (2009, p. 1).
Accommodating Minority Shareholdings Within the European… 281
123
the near future, as it will no longer be a member state. In the unlikely event that the
UK changes its mind and decides to stay in the Union, it should consider moving
from a voluntary to a mandatory notification system for mergers and minority
shareholdings, thereby catching the said few cases as well as helping to achieve a
more level playing field across the EU on this matter.
NCAs, like the Commission, would have up to 25 working days to make the
initial assessment in respect of minority shareholdings with a potential Community
competition concern that come within their ambit to apply EU law. Moreover, in
order for the NCAs to be in a position to make the assessment, they will require the
notifying parties to provide them with certain information, and this means the latter
would complete an equivalent to the earlier mentioned revised CO Form. In fact, by
NCAs working together as well as with the Commission, a standardised Form could
be devised and applied by all regulators, establishing a harmonised EU-wide
approach that helps safeguard the SEM. The required information to be provided by
the notifying parties has already been outlined and would necessarily include
information on the geographical scope of the affected markets. This is key to
determining if a competition concern has a Community or national dimension, and
therefore if the case comes under EU or member state law. Clearly this is important
for the three NCAs that have this vetting capability under their own domestic law.
For the rest—the great majority of NCAs—an investigation to determine if a
captured minority shareholding had a Community competition concern would
automatically reveal if the concern was in fact isolated within a national market. It is
hoped that this ability to determine which cases should come under domestic law
will act as a spur to the concerned member states to amend their respective domestic
merger laws to encompass minority shareholdings. Yet, which member states will
do so, and the varying rate of those that decide to make this amendment, remains
unknown. Obviously, all member states must make this amendment to their
respective merger regimes for this particular enforcement gap to be ended.
For the three existing member states which already have this capability—and
accepting that the UK will leave the Union—and for those that adopt it in the near
future, captured minority shareholdings that come under their jurisdiction, as with
mergers in this position under the cooperative approach, face one of three probable
outcomes: no appreciable competition concern and therefore approved under both
EU and national law; a Community competition concern vetted under EU law and
EU merger procedures; or an isolated national competition concern vetted under
domestic law. Clearly, the last mentioned would not be available to an NCA where
the member state has not enacted the said amendment to its national merger regime,
with its minority shareholding cases that have a national competition concern
continuing to be unregulated.
This then leaves to be addressed the matter of minority shareholdings with a
potential Community competition concern that notify with three or more NCAs. In
line with mergers in this situation under the more cooperative approach, and for the
same reasons, these minority shareholdings will face mandatory and automatic
centralisation to the Competition Directorate and EU law. This is because the scale
of notification suggests that the likely competition concern is at a Community level,
possibly EU-wide, or even global in some cases, and hence their investigation is
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more suited to the resources and experience of the Competition Directorate, rather
than an NCA, in line with the reinterpreted more appropriate authority goal. This
therefore means that—with the exception of the few cases missed by the UK while it
remains a member of the EU—all minority shareholdings with a potential
Community concern that are missed by the two CD tests or wrongly centralised
by the two-thirds rule will be vetted under EU law: those notifying with one or two
member states by an NCA and those caught by the said rule by the Competition
Directorate. This enforcement gap is de facto ended.
Furthermore, the three or more NCA notification rule appears to satisfy both the
Commission’s first principle and the principle of subsidiarity, as well as ensuring
that the concerned parties face a one-stop shop approach, in line with the second
principle. Moreover, because the rule is mandatory and automatic, it leads to a more
streamlined architecture in practice than if the voluntary and administratively
cumbersome Article 4(5) EUMR centralisation corrective were adopted. In fact, the
three or more member state notification rule ends the need for either the Article 4(5)
or Article 22 EUMR centralisation route for these cases. Indeed, when combined
with the fact that minority shareholdings with a potential Community competition
concern that are notified with one or two NCAs will now be vetted under EU law at
member state level, the rule ends the need for either of the aforesaid centralisation
correctives, as is also true of mergers under the more cooperative architecture.
Yet, and unsurprisingly, the three or more member state rule concerning minority
shareholdings has the same flaw as the identical rule in respect of mergers under the
more cooperative approach. Specifically, a small number of the minority
shareholdings centralised to Brussels under this rule will not have a Community
competition concern but one that is isolated within a member state. As with minority
shareholdings with a national competition concern caught by the two CD tests, and
for the same reasons (see above), these shareholdings will be vetted by the
Competition Directorate under EU law. This, of course, is not consistent with the
principle of subsidiarity but this is largely overridden by the fact that the great
majority of member states have no capability to carry out the vetting of minority
shareholdings under their own law. However, it is consistent with the vetting of
mergers in this situation under the more cooperative approach. Moreover, it not only
fits the reinterpreted more appropriate authority goal, but is also in tune with the
one-stop shop approach. Furthermore, because the aforesaid minority shareholdings
caught by either the CD tests or the three or more member state notification rule are
to be vetted by the Competition Directorate, the Commission’s proposed Article 9
EUMR decentralisation corrective is unnecessary. In fact, this ends the need for any
of the current EUMR decentralisation and centralisation correctives, as is also true
in respect of mergers under the more cooperative approach.
Conclusion
The paper has explained in detail how the envisaged extension of the more
cooperative approach to the field of minority shareholdings would ensure that
virtually all such shareholdings with a potential Community competition concern
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would be vetted under EU law and EU merger procedures, thereby ending this
enforcement gap. In particular, it has demonstrated how the various components of
the more cooperative approach—including both the Commission and each member
state merger regime adopting the targeted competitively significant link assessment,
a standardised Form that will be used by all the aforesaid regulators, the three or
more member state notification rule, as well as the Competition Directorate and
NCAs applying EU law using EU procedures, albeit intentionally in different
circumstances—cumulatively link to guarantee that the aforesaid minority share-
holdings would be vetted under EU law, in line with the principle of subsidiarity.
Moreover, as demonstrated, the Commission’s minority shareholding proposal
would be unable to achieve this.
Other positives would also arise: first, the adoption of the competitively
significant link assessment by the said regulators will help guarantee that only
minority shareholding cases with a likely Community competition concern are
caught, thereby ensuring that the rest—the majority—do not face the burden of an
unnecessary notification and initial investigation, and of course the regulators
wasting time and resources in carrying it out. This therefore appears to satisfy the
EU’s Competition Commissioner, Margrethe Vestager’s, condition that the
jurisdictional minority shareholding test is able to get at the ‘‘needles, without
toppling the haystack’’.92 Second, because the Competition Directorate and NCAs
would use a standardised competitively significant link assessment and a
standardised Form, in addition to both using EU procedures in minority
shareholding cases with a potential Community competition concern, consistency
of approach across the Union is made all the more likely, supporting the SEM.
Third, the more cooperative approach to minority shareholdings generally meets the
reinterpreted more appropriate authority goal. Finally, and importantly, the more
cooperative approach concerning minority shareholdings, as with mergers under this
approach, would have no requirement for the current cumbersome correctives,
thereby streamlining the working of the architecture of separate jurisdictional zones.
Yet for the more cooperative approach to work effectively in practice—and this
is true of both mergers and minority shareholdings—greater cooperation between
regulators is essential. Indeed, such cooperation is a necessity to ensure consistent
decision-making in the application of EU law in this field, thereby helping to protect
competition at the EU level, which in turn buttresses the SEM. In fact, this type of
cooperation already successfully exists in a related field of EU competition law—
the application of 101 and 102 TFEU.93 The more cooperative approach envisages
three strands of cooperation between regulators, and for this cooperation to work in
practice, it is necessary for the involved regulators to be able to share information
provided by the concerned parties. This right of access would therefore be enshrined
in law.
92 Vestager. 2016. Refining the EU merger control system SPEECH Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht,
Brussels, 10 March 2016.
93 Supra n. 85, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement
under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives, SWD(2014) 231/2, paragraphs 3–5.
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The first strand of cooperation has already been explained and it relates to
minority shareholding and merger cases centralised to Brussels by the two CD tests
and the three member state notification rule that only have an isolated national
competition concern. Clearly, the principle of subsidiarity requires that these cases
should be dealt with under the relevant member state law. However, given that these
cases are few in number and are already with the Competition Directorate, which
has the specialists to vet them, albeit under EU law, there is a logic and convenience
for having them remain with Brussels. This is reinforced in relation to such minority
shareholding cases by the fact that the great majority of member states lack the
domestic capability to vet them. However, the Competition Directorate, when
vetting such a merger or minority shareholding case, would be expected to
cooperate with the relevant NCA, benefitting from the latter’s local knowledge and
expertise. Moreover, this cooperation with the Competition Directorate would
enable NCA staff to gain experience in applying EU law in minority shareholding
cases, an experience that would aid them when applying this law in similar cases
that came under their jurisdictional ambit as part of the more cooperative approach.
This is clearly in tune with the reinterpreted more appropriate authority goal.
The second and third strands of cooperation concern those merger or minority
shareholding cases captured by either the one or two member state notification rule
or the two-thirds rule that are to be vetted by NCAs using EU law. When such a case
has a serious cross-border competition impact, then the two concerned NCAs would
act a single team in relation to its investigation and conclusion, in line with the one-
stop shop approach. Further, as intended by the reinterpreted more appropriate
authority goal, the accuracy of the decision in such a case will benefit from the local
knowledge and experience of each of the involved NCAs. Cooperation is also
important when the centre of gravity of the competition concern in such a case is
principally, but not solely, in one member state. This is because the NCA which
leads the investigation and makes the decision—the one from the member state
experiencing the greatest competition impact—would not only take on board the
concerns of the other NCA but also benefit from its local knowledge and experience,
thereby helping to guarantee an effective decision. Of course, it is also supportive of
the one-stop shop approach and fits with the reinterpreted more appropriate
authority goal.
The third strand of cooperation would be between the Competition Directorate
and NCAs, and relates to when the latter apply EU law in the aforesaid merger and
minority shareholding cases. In respect of the merger cases, the Competition
Directorate’s considerable experience in vetting these cases means that it would be
able to provide guidance and support to NCAs when applying the said law and this
will aid consistent decision-making, which in turn buttresses the SEM. Concerning
minority shareholding cases, as the Competition Directorate and NCAs have either
little or no experience vetting these cases, then cooperation is absolutely essential to
the establishment of a culture facilitating uniform decision making under EU law.
Clearly this matter is of such importance as to require a much more detailed and
considered treatment, but that is beyond the scope of the paper. Finally, in order to
help guarantee consistent decision-making in the said merger and minority
shareholding cases, the Commission would reserve the right to take a case from
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an NCA if the latter, for whatever reason, was unable to effectively carry-out its
regulatory obligation. Obviously, this would be a last resort safeguard and hopefully
will not be required.
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